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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
In Judulang, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled the 
Ninth Circuit’s approval of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) approach to deportation proceedings.  Former Section 212(c) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), provides 
for a “waiver of excludability,” permitting a non-citizen legal 
resident to remain in the country in spite of a criminal conviction.  In 
2005, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) sought to 
remove Joel Judulang from the United States on the grounds that he 
had committed an aggravated felony involving a crime of violence. 
Such a crime, the BIA held, was not comparable to any ground for 
exclusion determined by DHS and renders Section 212(c) 
inapplicable. The Court found the BIA’s comparable grounds 
approach to be arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Joel Judulang, a native of the Philippines, entered the United 
States in 1974 at the age of eight, and has lived continuously in the 
U.S. as a lawful permanent resident.
1
  In 1988, Judulang was 
involved in a fight where a person was shot and killed.
2
 Subsequent 
to being charged as an accessory, Judulang pled guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter and received a six year suspended sentence.
3
 In 2005, 
Judulang pled guilty to another criminal offense involving theft.
4
  
Shortly thereafter, DHS commenced deportation proceedings.
5
 
Judulang was charged with having committed an “aggravated 
felony” involving “a crime of violence,” premised on the 1988 
manslaughter conviction, pursuant to U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 
                                                          
1 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482 (2011). 
2 Id. at 483. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
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1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
6
 The administrative law judge ordered 
deportation, and the BIA affirmed on appeal.
7
 In the latter 
proceeding, the BIA considered whether Judulang could make use of  
what is known as  section 212(c) relief.
8
 Under this provision, 
immigration authorities deploy the comparable grounds approach  by 
which they look to the statutory ground which DHS has determined 
to be a basis for exclusion; and, provided the charges do not fall 
outside DHS’s list, the alien is eligible for discretionary relief.9  From 
there, the analyses turns on such factors as: “the seriousness of the 
offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the duration 
of the alien's residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the 
number of citizens in the family, and the character of any service in 
the Armed Forces.”10  
The BIA held that Judulang could not invoke section 212(c) 
relief because “crime[s] of violence” are grounds for deportation not 
comparable to any of DHS’s exclusion grounds.11 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review in reliance on the 
circuit’s precedents upholding BIA's comparable grounds 
approach.
12
 Justice Kagan described the comparable grounds 
approach as such:  
 
Those mathematically inclined might think of the 
comparable-grounds approach as employing Venn 
diagrams. Within one circle are all the criminal 
offenses composing the particular ground of 
deportation charged. Within other circles are the 
offenses composing the various exclusion grounds. 
When, but only when, the “deportation circle” 
sufficiently corresponds to one of the “exclusion 
circles” may an alien apply for § 212(c) relief.13 
 
                                                          
6 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 481.  
10 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 481 (citation omitted).  
11 Id. at 483.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
    
406 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-1 
 
The Supreme Court granted cert in order to resolve a split 
among the circuits as to whether the BIA’s approach is proper.14  
 
Holding: 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously overruled the BIA’s 
interpretation of the law regarding eligibility for section 212(c) relief, 
stating that “the BIA has failed to exercise its discretion in a reasoned 
manner.”15 Given that DHS has charged a lawful permanent resident 
with being removable for having been convicted of an aggravated 
felony, and the offense is not specifically named as a ground of 
inadmissibility, the Court held that the BIA’s approach is arbitrary 
and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act.
16
 The case 
was remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.”17 While the Court did not 
put forth a preferred approach, the judgment effectively throws out 
the comparable grounds approach.
18
 
The Court reasoned that the comparable grounds approach is 
not premised on any considerations pertinent to whether an alien 
should be deported.
19
 In effect, the BIA’s current approach  dictates 
who should be eligible for discretionary relief by utilizing a 
comparison that rests upon diverse statutory categories.
20
 As a result,  
the BIA’s analysis reflects no relation to the goals of the deportation 
process.
21
 Further, such a policy will lead to aliens who are similarly 
situated being treated significantly different for reasons divorced 
from the policy behind deportation.
22
 The Court stressed that the 
BIA's approach must not remain “unmoored from the purposes and 
concerns of the immigration laws.”23  
 
                                                          
14 Id. at 483. 
15 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484. 
16 Id. at 487. 
17 Id. at 490. 
18 Id. at 485-87. 
19 Id. at 485. 
20 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485. 
21 Id. at 485-87. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 490. 
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Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Reynolds addressed a provision of the federal Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act, a provision which requires 
convicted sex offenders to provide state governments with current 
information for state and federal sex offender registries. Reynolds, 
whose offence pre-dated the Act, registered in Missouri in 2005 but 
moved to Pennsylvania in September 2007 without informing the 
authorities in Missouri or Pennsylvania. Upon being indicted, 
Reynolds moved to dismiss arguing that that the Act was not 
applicable to pre-Act offenders during the time at issue. The District 
Court rejected Reynolds' motion, and the Third Circuit concluded 
that the registration requirements applied to pre-Act offenders. The 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that pre-Act offenders need not 
register before the Attorney General validly specifies that the Act's 
registration provisions apply to that particular population.  
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Petitioner Billy Joe Reynolds committed a sex offense that 
predates the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act.
24
 The present case arose when Reynolds was charged with 
violating the Act by failing to register between September 16 and 
October 16, 2007.
25
 After serving four years in prison for his original 
offense, in July 2005 Reynolds registered as a Missouri sex 
offender.
26
  Subsequently, Reynolds moved to Pennsylvania where he 
failed to update his Missouri registration information and register 
anew in Pennsylvania.
27
 A federal grand jury indicted him, charging 
him with having “knowingly failed to register and update a 
registration as required by [the Act].”28  
                                                          
24 Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 979 (2012); 120 Stat. 590, 42 
U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. III). 
25 Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 979.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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Reynolds filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that in 
September and October 2007 the federal registration requirements 
had yet to come into effect with respect to pre-Act offenders.
29
 The 
Act had become law earlier in July 2006 and the Attorney General 
had already promulgated an Interim Rule making the registration 
requirements applicable to pre-Act offenders.
30
 Nevertheless, 
Reynolds’ motion maintained that the Interim Rule was invalid as it 
violated the Constitution's “nondelegation” doctrine and the 
Administrative Procedure Act's “good cause” requirement for 
promulgating a rule without “notice and comment.”31  
Reynolds' legal argument was rejected by the District Court 
on the merits.
32
  On appeal, the Third Circuit never addressed the 
merits because it found that even in the absence of any initiative by 
the Attorney General the Act required Reynolds and pre-Act 
offenders to follow the registration requirements.
33
  Approximately 
half of the circuit courts disagree as they have held that the Act's 
registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders 
notwithstanding direction from the Attorney General.
34
  Recognizing 
the split among the circuits, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the 
issue.
35
 
 
Holding: 
 
The Supreme Court found that the federal Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act’s registration requirements do not 
apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General so specifies.
36
 
Finding that the Attorney General's Interim Rule matters as to the 
resolution of Reynolds’s case, the Court reversed the Third Circuit's 
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent 
with the opinion.
37
  
                                                          
29 Id. at 979-80. 
30 Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980.  
36 Id. at 984. 
37 Id. 
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The Court first explained that a natural reading of the law 
supports the conclusion.  The first part of the law states that “[a] sex 
offender shall register, and keep the registration current,” while it 
states later that “[t]he Attorney General shall have the authority to 
specify the applicability of the requirements . . . to sex offenders 
convicted before the enactment . . . .”38 As such, it was reasoned that 
the latter provision should control the law’s application to that 
particular group of offenders.
39
 Further, the Court reasoned, the 
holding comports with congressional concerns about the application 
of the registration requirement to pre-Act offenders and Congress’s 
intention of allowing the Attorney General to supplement what the 
Court referred to as “potential lacunae,” or gaps in the law.40  
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, finding 
that the Act required registration of pre-Act offenders through its 
own language arguing that the Attorney General was delegated only 
authority to exempt pre-Act offenders from the registration 
requirements.
41
  Justice Scalia challenged the majority directly, 
stating that his was the more natural reading of the law.
42
 Ultimately, 
the dissenting Justices would have counted the non-delegation 
principle against a power to activate because the power to exempt 
avoids the constitutional problem and is more consistent with the 
traditional discretion held by prosecutors.
43
 
 
Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency,  
132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) 
  
Synopsis: 
 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held in Sackett 
v. EPA that persons subject to cease and desist orders issued by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the Clean Water 
Act may challenge the order by going directly to federal court.  Upon  
receiving a compliance order from the EPA pursuant to the Clean 
                                                          
38 Id. at 981. 
39 Id. 
40 Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 982.  
41 Id. at 985-87. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
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Water Act, the Sacketts sought declarative and injunctive relief in a 
federal District Court invoking the Administrative Procedure Act. 
The District Court dismissed the action claiming a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction and the Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that the 
Clean Water Act precluded pre-enforcement judicial review. The 
Supreme Court reversed holding that the order at issue was a final 
agency action allowing for judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Michael and Chantell Sackett owned a residential lot in Idaho, 
which they filled, in part, with dirt and rock.
44
 Upon becoming aware 
of the filling activity, the EPA issued an administrative compliance 
order pursuant to the Clean Water Act.
45
 The EPA made a 
determination that the Sacketts had violated the Clean Water Act 
because their lot contained wetlands under the EPA's regulatory 
jurisdiction.
46
 The order required the Sacketts to immediately restore 
the wetlands and provide the EPA access to the site and all 
documents pertinent to its conditions.
47
  
Maintaining that their property was not subject to the EPA 
regulations, the Sacketts requested a hearing with the EPA, which 
was denied.
48
  The Sacketts then filed an action in federal District 
Court making claims pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act 
and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
49
 The lower 
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because there was no “final agency action” which makes judicial 
review permissible.
50
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed stating 
that the Clean Water Act “preclude[s] pre-enforcement judicial 
review of compliance orders” and adding that such preclusion of 
                                                          
44 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012). 
45 Id. at 1370-71.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 1371.  
48 Id.  
49 Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371. 
50 Id. 
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judicial review does not violate the Sacketts’ due process rights under 
the Fifth Amendment.
51
 
 
Holding: 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the Sacketts could 
challenge the EPA's administrative compliance order in a U.S. 
District Court.
52
 However, the Court did not decide on the merits as 
to whether the property in question contains wetland regulated under 
the Clean Water Act nor as to the Sacketts’ due process rights.53 
Holding on more narrow grounds, the Court found that the EPA's 
administrative order was immediately subject to judicial review 
under the Administrative Procedures Act.
54
 
The Court held that an administrative compliance order 
represents a “final agency action,” a prerequisite for judicial 
review.
55
  Well established precedent provides that an agency action 
is final if it: 1) determines rights or obligations, or is an action from 
which legal consequences flow, and 2) marks the consummation of 
the agency's decision-making process.
56
 As such, the Court held that 
the EPA’s order to the Sacketts determined their rights or obligations 
as it created a legal obligation to restore the property and would have 
given the EPA access to the site and to the Sacketts’ documents.57 
Correspondingly, the EPA’s action created legal consequences by 
exposing the Sacketts to daily penalties in addition to other negative 
impacts.
58
 Further, the Court reasoned that the order was a 
consummation of the agency's decision-making process because the 
Sacketts had no recourse to further agency review.
59
 The Court also 
held that the Clean Water Act does not preclude judicial review 
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1374. 
53 Id.  
54 Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374. 
55 Id. at 1373. 
56 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997); Port of Boston 
Marine Terminal Ass’n. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 
(1970). 
57 Sackett,  132 S. Ct. at 1372. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
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because the Administrative Procedures Act creates a presumption of 
judicial review with respect to administrative agency actions.
60
 
 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL 
 
EME Homer City Generation, LP v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, No. 11-1302 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
 
Synopsis:  
 
 In EME Homer City Generation, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit granted a stay on the implementation of 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) latest, and 
controversial, air pollution rule. A group of power companies 
challenged the rule arguing it placed an undue financial burden on 
power producers.  The per curium order was handed down forty-eight 
hours before the rule was to come into effect and stated only that the 
petitioners had met the requirements for a stay. The court emphasized 
that the order was not a decision on the merits, but only a delay 
pending the court’s completion of its review. 
 
Facts and Analysis:  
 
Several private companies, in addition to the states of 
Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Texas and Virginia, sued the EPA in federal District Court 
challenging the implementation of the EPA’s Cross-State Air 
Pollution Rule (“the Rule”).61 The parties originally filed seven 
separate cases, which had been consolidated into a single case.
62
  
The Rule was promulgated by the EPA in 2011 pursuant to 
the authority given to it under the Clean Air Act, and requires certain 
states to reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions in order 
to reduce the impact of air quality down-wind in other states.
63
 
                                                          
60 Id. at 1373.  
61 EME Homer City Generation, LP v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
No. 11-1302, (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) [EME I]. 
62 Id. 
63 United States v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, 823 F. Supp. 2d 274, 
277-78 (W.D. Pa. 2011) [EME II].  
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Impacting a total of twenty-seven states, the Rule was scheduled to 
come into effect on January 1, 2012.
64
 The Rule significantly 
expands the EPA’s authority because, where the EPA is now limited 
to only setting air quality standards, the Rule includes enforcement 
provisions, a prerogative long maintained by individual state 
governments.
65
  
Plaintiffs moved to stay the Rule in an effort to prevent it 
from coming into effect as scheduled.
66
 The challengers put forth 
similar arguments demonstrating the four factors necessary for a stay 
on administrative action.
67
 First, it was argued that plaintiffs are 
likely to prevail on the merits because the promulgation is improper 
without providing states the chance to create their own 
implementation plans; and, the EPA’s actions were arbitrary and 
capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act.
68
 Second, it is 
argued that the parties will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not 
granted because the Rule will have a detrimental effect on state 
economies and threatens their citizens’ access to affordable energy.69 
Third, that there is no possibility of substantial harm to other parties 
if a stay is granted as the rules already in place will remain until the 
EPA can promulgate valid new rules.
70
 As for the final factor, 
plaintiffs maintain that the public interest favors granting the motion 
to stay because it will protect consumers from increases in power 
rates.
71
  
 
Holding:  
 
On December 30, 2011, forty-eight hours before the Rule was 
to come into effect, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit stayed implementation of the EPA’s new rule.72 The Court’s 
decision stays the Rule in its entirety pending completion of judicial 
                                                          
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 290. 
68 EME II, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 290. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
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review.
73
  The order left much to the imagination as it provided little 
explanation, stating only that the requirements for a stay had been 
met.
74
 While preserving the status quo for the time being, the per 
curium order is not a ruling on the merits.
75
 In light of the stay, the 
court ordered the EPA to continue enforcing the regulation that was 
set to be replaced by the Rule.
76
 
 
Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc., v. United States,  
674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis:  
 
In a challenge to provisions of the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, the Sixth Circuit in Discount 
Tobacco largely upheld the constitutionality of the new warning label 
requirements on tobacco products. The plaintiffs argued that the 
burden placed upon them by the law outweighs any legitimate 
government interest in conveying factual information to consumers, 
and moreover, effectively overshadows and dominates plaintiffs’ 
speech. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that the warning 
requirements are mostly valid as they materially advance the 
government’s stated interest. However, the provision banning the use 
of color and graphics in tobacco advertising was struck down as 
“vastly overbroad.” 
 
Facts and Analysis:  
 
In 2009, Congress enacted, and the President signed into law, 
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.
77
 The law 
grants the power to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to 
regulate tobacco products for the stated purpose of addressing “issues 
of particular concern to public health officials, including the use of 
tobacco by young people and dependence on tobacco.”78 Moreover, 
                                                          
73 EME II, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 290. 
74 Id. 
75 See Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Pub.L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009). 
78 Id. at § 3(2). 
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the Act seeks “to promote cessation” of tobacco use in order “to 
reduce disease risk and the social costs associated with tobacco-
related diseases.”79 The policy’s origin can be traced, in part, to a 
study by the FDA, where several significant findings were reported 
with respect to tobacco use among juveniles.
80
  
In August 2009, a group of tobacco manufacturers and sellers 
brought suit against the United States in federal District Court 
claiming that provisions of the law: 1) violate free speech rights 
under the First Amendment, 2) constitute an unlawful taking pursuant 
to the Fifth Amendment, and 3) infringe on Fifth Amendment due 
process rights.
81
 The challenged portion of the law requires the 
following:  
 
(1) that tobacco manufacturers reserve a significant 
portion of tobacco packaging for the display of health 
warnings, including graphic images intended to 
illustrate the hazards of smoking; (2) restrictions on 
the commercial marketing of so-called “modified risk 
tobacco products;” (3) ban of statements that implicitly 
or explicitly convey the impression that tobacco 
products are approved by, or safer by virtue of being 
regulated by, the FDA; (4) restriction on the 
advertising of tobacco products to black text on a 
white background in most media; and (5) bar on the 
distribution of free samples of tobacco products in 
most locations, brand-name tobacco sponsorship of 
any athletic or social event, branded merchandising of 
any non-tobacco product, and distribution of free items 
in consideration of a tobacco purchase (i.e., 
“continuity programs”).82 
 
The lower court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs 
as to the claims that the prohibition on color and graphics in 
advertising and the ban on statements implying that tobacco products 
                                                          
79 Id. at § 3(9). 
80 Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc., v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 
519 (6th Cir. 2012). 
81 Id. at 521. 
82 Id. at 520. 
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are safer due to FDA regulation violated the First Amendment.
83
 
Summary judgment was granted for the government with respect to 
plaintiff’s remaining claims.84 
 
Holding:  
 
In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court 
findings as to the validity of the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act's restrictions on the marketing of modified-risk 
tobacco products; prohibition on event sponsorship, branding non-
tobacco merchandise, and free sampling, and the requirement that 
tobacco manufacturers reserve packaging space for textual health 
warnings.
 85
 The District Court judgment was also affirmed as to the 
unconstitutionality of the law’s limitation on tobacco advertising to 
black and white text.
86
 Lastly, the court of appeal affirmed as to the 
non-graphic warning label requirement.
87
 On the other hand, the 
lower court was reversed with respect to the following: that the 
restriction on statements regarding the relative safety of tobacco 
products based on FDA regulation is unconstitutional and its finding 
that the law’s ban on tobacco continuity programs is permissible 
under the First Amendment.
88
 
The opinion began by highlighting the problem of juvenile 
tobacco use, citing the “thousands of pages of medical studies and 
governmental reports supporting the conclusion that the use of 
tobacco, especially by juveniles, poses an enormous threat to the 
nation's health, and imposes grave costs on the government.”89 As 
such, the court stated that “[t]here can be no doubt that the 
government has a significant interest in preventing juvenile smoking 
and in warning the general public about the harms associated with the 
use of tobacco products.”90 Nevertheless, the court pointed out that 
the sale and use of tobacco by adults is a legal activity and that the 
                                                          
83 Id. at 521. 
84 Id. 
85 Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 518. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 519. 
90 Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 519. 
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tobacco industry and its consumers have an important interest in 
truthful information related to the use of tobacco.
91
 
The court found significant the lack of consumer awareness 
regarding the serious health risks resulting from “the decades-long 
deception by Tobacco Companies.”92 The majority then went even 
further stating that it  “bears emphasizing that the risks here include 
the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs' products literally kill users and, 
often, members of the families of users . . .”93 These sentiments led to 
the conclusions that the warning requirements are “reasonably related 
to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception and 
are therefore constitutional.”94 
 
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazaar,  
672 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis:  
 
In Alliance for the Wild Rockies, the Ninth Circuit upheld a 
provision of the 2011 Appropriations Act which ordered the 
Secretary of the Interior to remove a specified population of grey 
wolves from Endangered Species Act's (“ESA”) protection.  The law 
effectively overruled an earlier court decision that found that such a 
partial delisting of a species would violate the ESA.  Environmental 
advocacy groups challenged that law citing separation of powers, 
arguing that Congress was forcing the courts to rule as it willed. The 
lower court rejected this theory holding that Congress had acted 
within its constitutional authority to alter the laws even when a 
particular law is subject to contemporaneous litigation. The Ninth 
Circuit agreed, finding that Congress had simply amended the law.  
 
Facts and Analysis:  
 
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) has, on 
numerous occasions, attempted to exclude a distinct population of 
grey wolves found in the northern Rocky Mountains from federal 
                                                          
91 Id. at 520. 
92 Id. at 562. 
93 Id. at 596. 
94 Id. 
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protections under the ESA pursuant to its rule making authority.
95
 In 
its latest effort, a District Court struck down the rule because the 
ESA did not permit partial delisting of a distinct population of a 
protected species.
96
 While that case was pending before an appeals 
court, proponents of the delisting turned to Congress which altered 
the ESA in section 1713 of an appropriations bill signed into law on 
April 15, 2011.
97
 Section 1713 requires the Secretary of the Interior 
to reissue the delisting rule “without regard to any other provision of 
statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule.”98 Further, 
the Secretary “shall not be subject to judicial review . . . .”99  
In May 2011, the FWS complied with Section 1713 and 
reissued the rule delisting the specified population of grey wolves.
100
 
A group of environmental activists filed the present action in a 
federal District Court claiming that Section 1713 was 
unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine.
101
 The 
plaintiffs relied heavily United States v. Klein, which held that 
Congress unconstitutionally violated the separation of powers 
doctrine by directing the Court to make a factual finding regarding 
the probative weight of a presidential pardon.
102
 The District Court 
Judge was notably sympathetic to the claim stating that, “Section 
1713 sacrifices the spirit of the ESA to appease a vocal political 
faction.”103 Notwithstanding, the lower court conceded that “the 
wisdom of that choice is not now before this Court,” and 
begrudgingly granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs.
104
   
 
 
 
                                                          
95 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 672 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) 
[Alliance II]. 
96 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. 
Mont. 2010). 
97 See Pub. L. 112–10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 C.F.R. Part 17, 76 Fed. Reg. 25, 590 (2011). 
101 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. 
Mont. 2011) [Alliance I]. 
102 80 U.S. 128 (1871). 
103 Alliance I, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. 
104 Id. 
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Holding:  
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that 
Section 1713 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
105
 The 
court was under no illusions and noted that Congress had changed the 
law applicable to a particular case before the courts.
106
 However, the 
court reasoned that the judiciary was not being directed by Congress 
to reach a particular outcome, but rather was free to apply the new 
applicable law to the facts of the case.
107
 As such, it was held that 
Section 1713 merely constituted an amendment of the law which 
courts are bound to follow.
108
  
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a violation of the separation of 
power doctrine occurs where, (1) Congress has impermissibly 
directed certain findings in pending litigation, without changing any 
underlying law, or (2) a challenged statute is independently 
unconstitutional on other grounds.
109
 This precedent is premised on 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon 
Society, 503 U.S. 429, (1992), which held that “amended” or 
changed environmental laws applicable to a specific case did not 
violate the constitutional prerogatives of the courts.
110
 
Likening the present case to Robertson, the Ninth Circuit 
found “that Congress has directed an agency to take particular action 
challenged in pending litigation by changing the law applicable to 
that case.”111 Nevertheless, the court found that Congress did not 
repeal any part of the ESA.
112
 Rather, the court reasoned, Congress 
ordered that no statute, including the ESA, would apply to the FWS’s 
delisting rule once reissued.
113
 Congress thus amended the law which 
governs that agency’s action.114 Noting that the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that such amendments, as opposed to repeals, do not 
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constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, Section 
1713 was found to be valid.
115
  
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
National Association of Manufacturers v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 2012 WL 691535 (D.D.C. 2012) 
 
Synopsis:  
 
In National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”) exceeded its authority. The NLRB issued 
a rule on August 25, 2011 that requires employers subject to the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) to clearly post a notice in 
specified locations. While the court upheld the NLRB’s authority to 
make rules requiring such posting, its authority was exceeded when it 
deemed a failure to comply with the posting rule an unfair labor 
practice. 
 
Facts and Analysis:  
 
Congress has granted the NLRB the “authority from time to 
time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by 
National Labor Relations Act such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this National Labor Relations 
Act.”116 Pursuant to this authority, the NLRB issued a rule on August 
25, 2011 that requires employers under its authority to post notice of 
the rights of employees to organize into unions, bargain collectively, 
discuss wages, benefits and working conditions, jointly complain, 
and strike and picket, along with contact information for the NLRB 
and information regarding enforcement procedures.
117
 The posting 
must be: in a conspicuous place, where other notices to employees 
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are customarily posted, and on electronic sites if the employer 
customarily communicates through such means.
118
  
 Moreover, if twenty percent or more of the workforce is not 
proficient in English and speaks a language other than English, the 
notice must be written in the language employees speak.
119
 Failure to 
comply with these rules was to be deemed unfair labor practices.
120
 
The National Association of Manufacturers challenged the 
new rule in a federal District Court on four grounds.
121
 First, they 
argued that the NLRA does not grant the NLRB the authority to 
require employers to post a notification of employee rights. Second, 
that the NLRB’s powers are triggered when some complaint or 
petition is filed and not before.
122
 Third, that the NLRB is not 
permitted to establish a new unfair labor practice absent statutory 
authority.
123
 And finally,  that the new regulation allows employee to 
file unfair labor practice charges after the statute of limitations has 
expired.
124
  
 
Holding:  
 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
the NLRB had exceeded its authority and correspondingly struck 
down part of the rule.
125
 The court first noted that Congress 
“expressly [granted] the Board the broad rulemaking authority to 
make rules necessary to carry out any of the provisions of the 
National Labor Relations Act.” Further, the court found the posting 
requirement to be appropriate and reasonable under the authority 
granted to it.
126
  However,  it was held that the NLRB exceeded its 
authority by deeming the failure to comply with post requirement  an 
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unfair labor practice.
127
 The court also agreed with the plaintiff as to 
the statute of limitation issue.
128
 
With respect to the NLRB’s ability to make rules requiring 
employers to post notices, the court found that Congress did not 
unambiguously intend to preclude the agency from promulgating 
such rules, which inform employees of their rights under the 
NLRA.
129
 The text of the statute, the court reasoned, could not justify 
such a narrow interpretation of the NLRB’s authority.130  
On the other hand, the court found that the NLRB did exceed 
its authority it classifying a violation of the posting requirement as an 
unfair labor practice.131 The court reasoned that the new rule makes 
the failure to post a per se violation.
132
 The court explained that 
violations must be addressed on a case-by-case basis and instructed 
the NLRB to “make a specific finding based on the facts and 
circumstances in the individual case before it that the failure to post 
interfered with the employee's exercise of his or her rights.”133In 
addition, the NLRB exceeded its authority because the new rules 
tolling provisions “substantially amends the statute of limitations that 
Congress expressly set out in the statute.”134 
As some provisions of the rule were found to be valid and 
others invalid, the court turned to the issue of severability.
135
 
Although the rule lacked a severability clause, the court found the 
provisions were capable of standing alone and were not 
intertwined.
136
 Thus, the court held that the agency would have 
adopted the severed portion on its own and only struck down the 
portions of the rule where the NLRB exceeded its authority.
137
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